Multilayer Privilege Management for Dynamic Collaborative Scientific Communities by Chadwick, David W. et al.
UK Workshop on Grid Security Experiences, Oxford 8th and 9th July 2004 
Multilayer Privilege Management for Dynamic Collaborative 
Scientific Communities 
David Chadwicka, Theo Dimitrakosb, Kerstin Kleese-Van Damc, Damian 
Mac Randalb, Brian Matthewsb, Alexander Otenkoa 
aISI, University of Salford  
bCCLRC Rutherford Appleton Laboratory  
cCCLRC Daresbury Laboratory  
 
Abstract 
1 Introduction and Motivation 
Rapid advancements in Grid Computing and the convergence of Grid and Web Services, and 
the development of infrastructures such as the Ecology GRID (ECO 2003) and NERC DataGrid 
(Lawrence 2003), bring about protocols and machine-processable message/document formats 
that will soon enable seamless and open application-application communication. This will bring 
about the prospect of ad hoc integration of systems across institutional boundaries to support 
collaborations that may last for a single transaction or evolve over many years. We will witness 
on-demand creation of dynamically-evolving, scalable Virtual Organisations (VO) spanning 
national and institutional borders, where the participating entities pool resources, capabilities 
and information to achieve common objectives. 
As a motivating example, consider a hypothetical environmental project where there are 
several research groups in different institutes collaborating on a study of complex physical 
phenomenon which involves simulation and on-line analysis of existing atmospheric and 
oceanographic data (including satellite imagery).  Being a large project, it would have several 
work packages involving different parts of the consortia and running for different periods of 
time within the project timeframe.  The satellite images, plus significant quantities of metadata 
and derived data are held in data centres.  This data, collected from many sources, may be 
commercially sensitive, and therefore access is to be restricted to only those individually with a 
project-relevant need. 
The data owners may want to apply varying conditions on access to their data, e.g. non-
military personnel should only be given degraded versions of military sourced images, with 
different degradation filters applicable for different application domains.  The data centres have 
to ensure the security and confidentiality of data and so has to control who can do what on their 
machines, e.g. who can carry out cross database correlations, or upload filters to be applied to 
images.  The project, which is paying for the data access, wishes to control who is allowed to 
access the data and when.  It needs to be able to define several authorization groups (e.g. 
corresponding to work packages) and specify what data is available to that group.  The groups 
will have a specific lifetime, and individuals may join or leave the group during its lifetime, i.e. 
they are dynamic virtual organizations. 
The data centres need to take these different authorization policies and apply them for each 
of the actions and units of data being accessed.  This raises several challenges: 
 
Applying multiple authorization policies to control access to resources. 
Enforcing fine-grained access control at the resource. 
Managing dynamic virtual organizations comprising of resources and individuals authorized 
to use them. 
Handling the multiple authorities necessitated by distributed VOs and resources. 
Handling policy conflicts where individuals may play different roles, at the same time or at 
different times. 
 
In this paper we outline a new project, DyCom, which seeks to combine the results of two 
European projects, Grasp and PERMIS, to provide an architecture to manage the complex 
privileges required in such scenarios.  We will describe the mechanisms developed in these 
projects and show how they could be combined. 
2 Detailed Example 
As a motivating example consider the scenario in Figure 1. As a part of the scientific project, 
University researcher Alice needs to perform on-line analysis and simulation of atmospheric 
and oceanographic in order to study and complex physical phenomenon.  Using specialised 
services provided by different Application Service and Data Providers (ASP1, ASP2 and 
ASP3). Such services may include analysis tools (hosted at another institution SH1), pre-
existing data sets (held by a remote data archives SH2, SH3), additional computation power 
outsourced to a supercomputing centre acting as ASP1. The goal is, as the analysis proceeds, to 
create overlaying security perimeters, protecting different virtual collaborations that may exist 
at a time, while ensuring the security of each member as defined by its local administrator. 
Alice belongs to team of researchers assigned to a local administrator at the University. The 
main activities of the analysis and simulation are executed by end-to-end services CSI1 
provided by ASP1, and CS2 provided by ASP2. We assume that CSI1 is using sub-services 
executed in house at ASP1 who is responsible for administering CSI1 and its sub-services, 
whereas ASP2 is effectively outsourcing some of the sub-services to different service hosts SH1 
and SH2. Each administrator wants to protect its local “private” resources from the general 
“public” which may include hostile agents. At the same time seamless interaction between Alice 
and the end-to-end services, as well as CSI2 and its outsourced sub-services, is highly desirable 
























Figure 1. A motivating scenario 
 
This scenario highlights several issues related to secure collaboration in dynamic virtual 
organisations: 
?? Collaboration of resources that are controlled by different institutions. Each institution will 
have their own policies on access control and conditions of use. 
?? Resources may be called upon to participate in the task without previous knowledge of the 
other participants. Trust between resources has to be established in real time on a peer-to-
peer basis. 
?? Resources need to be protected from their collaborators and the whole collaboration team 
has to be protected from outsiders including other entities residing with the participating 
institutions. 
?? The same resource may interact in different contexts in groups corresponding to different 
collaborative project teams. A separation between those interactions has to be achieved. 
?? Different security conditions may be applied for different parts of the resource, including 
restrictions on data.  
?? Collaborating resources may play different roles in their organisation and various 
collaborations, and different (potentially conflicting) security policies may apply.  
?? There is no central administrative point. Security has to be achieved via devolved policy 
management combined with distributed enforcement. 
?? Complex trust relationships may hold between collaborating resources (users or services) 
and their managers: Trust of a resource may evolve over time based on the direct 
observations of its collaborators, witnessing whether it is performing as expected, given its 
role. Also, changes of the trust level in a manager may reflect on the trust level in the 
resources it manages, and vice versa. 
 
A suitable architecture must be able to provide a security and trust management 
infrastructure that meets these requirements.  
3 GRASP Security Infrastructure 
The GRASP project (http://www.eu-grasp.net) is an industry driven European research 
project, exploring the use of Grid Services to support the evolution of the Application Service 
Provision market towards a sustainable utility computing model. GRASP is developing an 
architectural framework for Grid-based application service provision, a prototype realisation of 
this framework, and “proof-of-concept” implementations of “federated” and “many-to-many” 
ASP models in the e-Learning and Biomedical domains. The implementation has been 
developed on top of Microsoft’s .NET platform and taking advantage of WSE (Web Service 






















Figure 2.  Types of interactions and communities within the GRASP Security Infrastructure 
 
The Security Infrastructure being developed within GRASP is based on secure collaboration 
groups which can be dynamically altered in terms of membership and policy constraints. The 
interaction model integrates a layered peer-to-peer model (between collaborating resources and 
between managers administering resources), with a centralised community management model 
(between members and their local managers) and a master/slave model (between security 
managers and enforcement agents). This is depicted in Figure 2. It supports on-demand creation 
and management of dynamic virtual collaborations in the form of secure groups of peers (user 
agents, services, resources, etc.) that cut across geographical and organisational boundaries. 
This architecture has been developed with two main goals in mind: 
 
?? Enabling communication within dynamically created collaboration groups, that is: secure, 
scalable, accountable, robust and independent of network topology. 
?? Enforcing security perimeters, which adapt to the highly dynamic evolution of a 
collaboration group (in terms of membership and security policy). 
 
These goals are addressed via: 
 
?? Certificates to manage group membership and privileges. 
?? Role based security policies describing permissions, prohibitions and obligations within the 
collaboration teams, set by, and negotiated between, the community managers. 
?? Mechanisms for end-entity enforcement of the security policies that protects individual 
members within a collaboration group and the collaboration group as a whole. 
 
This security architecture caters for enforcement at each end-point by creating a shell 
protecting each peer. This extends the notion of a distributed firewall by introducing further 
layers of control for group authentication and role-based access to service instance data and 
operations that are enforced (at the middleware layer) by a perimeter protecting each individual 
service, as depicted in Figure 3.  
Security perimeters for each peer contribute to the formation of a distributed security 
perimeter protecting a community. Security enforcement is controlled by the local security 
administrator of each member and it is coordinated by the administrator of the whole virtual 
group around which the distributed perimeter is established. For more on the GRASP Security 
Infrastructure and its foundation, see Dimitrakos 2002/3/4, Djordjevic 2004a/b, Ritrovato 2004).  
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Figure 3.  Overview of the GRASP distributed security enforcement architecture 
 
The current implementation of the GRASP Security Infrastructure realizes the distributed 
enforcement and community management models of this architecture.  Although the 
implementation allows for Attribute Certificates (AC) capturing role information relating to 
security policies, and for incorporation of an executable containing policy enforcement 
configuration code, a fully-fledges policy management mechanism and high level policy 
description language is currently absent.  
4 PERMIS 
PERMIS is a role-based Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI). Policies are written in 
XML and stored embedded in X.509 attribute certificates (ITu-T 2001) in an LDAP directory. 
Application gateways comprise an application dependent enforcement function (AEF) and 
application independent decision function (ADF). The interface between the AEF and the 
PERMIS ADF comprises a decision request and a decision response. This is implemented as 
either a Java API or as SAML (Oasis 2004) request/response messages, depending upon the 
choice of the application. A decision request currently comprises: the name of the user, the 
name of the target, and the action being requested, along with optional environmental 
parameters such as the time of day. PERMIS makes its access decisions according to the policy 
retrieved from the policy AC at initialisation time, and the role ACs of the user retrieved at 
decision time. The PERMIS system structure is illustrated in Figure 4. 
  
Figure 4: PERMIS API System Structure 
5 System integration challenges 
5.1 Data Grid Technologies 
For a data grid infrastructure to be easy to use and resilient, it will have to support diverse 
access criteria both within the metadata and the software. However, traditional Grid software 
solutions showed a lack of stable tools addressing a substantial fragment of the required policy 
space.  By integrating the dynamic community management architecture developed within the 
GRASP European project and the access control capabilities of PERMIS on top of the current 
data grid implementations, we expect to provide a reference implementation of a powerful and 
flexible access control enhancement on top of one of the data grid implementations.  
Furthermore, since the GRASP security infrastructure is built using popular and stable “of-
the-shelf” technologies and the PERMIS privilege management infrastructure is based on open 
standard web technologies, we expect the resulting enhancement to be reusable by a variety of 
domains beyond environmental science. 
5.2 GRASP 
There are four major changes to the current GRASP security infrastructure which are required 
to support the proposed infrastructure. 
?? Integration with PERMIS.  The local and community security administrators will have to be 
enhanced to use PERMIS to manage their security policies and to evaluate authorisations 
for requests from other group members.  There are two parts to this.  Firstly, the GRASP 
security administrators will have to be modified to use the PERMIS ACL, and to register 
these policies in the PERMIS LDAP server. Secondly they will also have to be modified to 
take advantage of PERMIS decision making mechanisms for allowing or denying a 
particular action by a particular user with a particular role.  Though the GRASP security 
infrastructure has basically been designed to support a policy management such as those 
provided by PERMIS, in current implementations decision making is hard-wired to the 
application, and therefore inflexible. 
?? Control of human administrators. When remote administrators are allowed to assign roles 
(in the form of X.509 ACs) to members of their domain, the VO administrator may want to 
limit the scope of their powers. The latter needs to be able to set an assignment policy. 
?? Recognition of authority (Otenko 2003) among different GRASP local security group 
administrators may also be necessary in order to allow the integration of the local PMI 
under the jurisdiction of each security administrator by providing a means to one local 
security administrator to understand the attributes set by another administrator, and exploit 
the relationship between them in the context of a virtual group that incorporates resources 
under both administrators. This feature has already been proposed in the DyVOSE project 
in Glasgow, and we would expect to use it, if provided. 
?? Integration into the data centres.  The GRASP security infrastructure relies on local 
security administrators on the resource site to enforce the relevant security policies.  These 
local security administrators will have to be integrated with the existing security 
mechanisms in place at the data centres,  GRASP has been implemented on top of 
OGSI.net, so is OGSI compliant.  Therefore in theory existing data grid wrappers could be 
minimally enhanced to invoke existing GRASP security services. However, in practice it 
will be necessary to co-locate the local security administrators with the wrappers and this 
implies that the GRASP security services will have to be re-implemented.  The group 
administrators could remain as OGSI.net services, but for consistency they will also be re-
implemented on a GT3 (or GT4) platform 
5.3 PERMIS 
To support this approach the following changes need to be made to PERMIS 
?? Separation of duties is needed to stop users with conflicting roles (potentially in different 
project teams) from accessing any of the conflicting resources. Separation of duties can be 
implemented by upgrading the PERMIS policy to list the conflicting roles, and to say which 
targets are forbidden to the role holders. When PERMIS operates in pull mode this will 
implement static separation of duties (since the user’s roles are statically stored in the 
LDAP directories used by PERMIS). However, when a user operates PERMIS in push 
mode, and only presents different subsets of roles to PERMIS on different login sessions, 
this dynamic separation of duties is more difficult to enforce. It will require PERMIS to 
keep a secure audit trail (called retained ADI in the ISO 10181-3 Access Control 
Framework [ITU-T 1995]) and to review this when making separation of duties decisions. 
?? Policy control is needed on authorities who allocate ACs to their users, to finely control the 
users to whom they are allowed to confer privileges. Without this fine-grained control at the 
allocating sites, the target site would need to have a much more complicated and finely 
tuned policy. In applications such as the ones being run by the data centre, coarse grained 
control is easier to manage at the target sites, with fine grained control at each of the 
allocating sites. This will be achieved by building a PERMIS decision engine into the 
Privilege Allocator and Bulk Loader tools that are part of the current PERMIS NMI release. 
These tools currently have no restrictions built into them, and their administrators can freely 
allocate any ACs to any users, the assumption being that the target site will determine which 
ACs are trusted. In the enhanced infrastructure, target SOAs and/or trusted site SOAs will 
be able to set PERMIS allocation policies on the privilege allocating tools. 
?? Conditional decision making will need to be implemented so as to restrict user access to one 
project only up to when another project becomes active. The PERMIS decision engine 
already supports conditional decision making, by allowing plug-in condition evaluating 
objects to be added to it. This project will build one such plug-in for PERMIS. 
6 Project Status 
The above approach to providing access control has bee accepted as the basis of a new JISC 
funded project, DyCom, between the University of Salford and CCLRC.  This is proposing to 
prototype the architecture within existing NERC funded environmental data grid projects.  The 
resulting implementation and guidance will then be packaged and released to the wider 
academic community for use in similar project within other domains.  
In another project (SIPS), Salford is proposing to modify the PERMIS interface to directly 
support Shibboleth, so that the SHAR can pass either attributes or ACs directly to PERMIS, or 
the SHAR can be completely bypassed and the handle passed to PERMIS from the SHIRE. We 
are assuming that the SIPS development will progress in parallel with this one and be ready to 
use when this proposal needs it.            
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